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ABSTRACT

The increasing popularity of eco-labeled products has given rise to numerous studies
showing that consumers will pay more for eco-labeled products than for similar non-labeled
products. One such pairing is hybrid vehicles and traditional combustion engine vehicles. This
analysis is the first attempt at identifying a willingness to pay for the hybrid vehicle label in
excess of the willingness to pay for fuel economy and reduced vehicle emissions. In this analysis
I apply a hedonic price model to new vehicle data from 2012, and also analyze county-level
vehicle registration data from Oregon. The hedonic price analysis shows that, for given levels of
fuel consumption and vehicle emissions, consumers pay more for a vehicle bearing the hybrid
label. The Oregon analysis shows that areas with higher proportions of environmentalists have
higher proportions of hybrid cars, even in locations that are not suited to hybrid use. Together,
these results suggest that consumers will pay more for a vehicle that bears the hybrid label
because that label increases the owner’s social status in the environmental community and
conveys to others the strength of the owner’s environmental commitment.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Green products have become increasingly popular over recent years. For example, the
Organic Trade Association (2011a) reports that the organic industry in the United States grew by
7.7% to $28.6 billion in 2010, and that 78% of families in the United States purchased organic
foods in 2011 (Organic Trade Association, 2011b). In order for consumers to purchase green
products, they must first be able to identify green products. Information regarding a product’s
environmental attributes can be communicated to consumers by eco-labels. In this way, ecolabels are designed to reduce information asymmetry between consumers and producers
(Delmas & Grant, 2010). Eco-labeling has become so prevalent that the Ecolabel Index currently
tracks 435 eco-labels in 197 countries across 25 industry sectors (Ecolabel Index, 2013). Ecolabels are only capable of reducing information asymmetry if labels clearly and accurately
represent their products. Delmas and Grant (2010) highlight several instances where the
presence of an eco-label actually causes consumers to perceive a product as less
environmentally friendly, either because the label is confusing or because consumers believe
the label is intentionally misrepresentative of the product.
Communication between consumers and producers can also be hindered if consumers
attach significance to eco-labels beyond the environmental qualities the labels were intended to
represent. This effect can be seen with hybrid vehicles. A vehicle with a hybrid engine uses less
fuel and emits less pollution than a vehicle with a traditional combustion engine driven the
same distance (Sims Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011). However, these attributes are not the only
messages consumers infer from the hybrid label. Consumers who self-identify as
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environmentalists also derive benefit from being seen in hybrid cars, as these vehicles
communicate to others the strength of the owners’ environmental commitment (Kahn, 2007).
Halbright and Dunn (2010) argue that this is why the Toyota Prius was the first hybrid car to
succeed in the U.S. market. The Prius was first introduced into the U.S. market in 2001 and only
sold 15,000 units that year. It also looked very much like any other small car. Sales did not take
off until the second generation Prius was introduced in 2004, featuring a visually distinctive
body design. Prius owners reported that they chose the Prius because it makes a clear and
strong statement about them, and that other hybrid cars were too subtle (Maynard, 2007).
Other car manufacturers have developed similar but distinct identities for their hybrid models.
In a New York Times article describing the Honda Accord Hybrid, John M. Broder (2004)
characterizes Honda’s perception of its hybrid customers as “a conservative bunch, not the sort
to advertise their virtue like owners of the Toyota Prius, who may want everyone to think their
cars can run on egg whites and organic chardonnay” (para. 5).
The hybrid label, therefore, confers social status on a vehicle’s owner (Kahn, 2007). If
consumers value this social status, then one would expect the price premium commanded by a
hybrid vehicle over a traditional vehicle to be in excess of what can be explained by decreased
fuel consumption and cleaner emissions alone. I apply a hedonic price analysis to data on new
vehicles available in the United States and Canada in 2012 to determine if consumers will pay
more for a hybrid vehicle than a traditional vehicle after controlling for fuel consumption and
emissions. I also examine county-level vehicle registration data from Oregon to assess the
relationship between hybrid ownership and environmentalism. Chapter Two contains a review
of previous research. In Chapter Three, I discuss the hedonic price model, data set, and
variables. Chapter Four contains the results of the hedonic price analysis and a discussion of the
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results. Chapter Five contains a description and analysis of the Oregon data set. Chapter Six
contains a summary and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
PREVIOUS LITERATURE

There is a long history of using the hedonic method to evaluate automobile pricing and
attributes (Atkinson & Halvorsen, 1984; Ohta & Griliches, 1986; Dreyfus & Viscusi, 1995; as in
Kiso, 2010). According to Lancaster (1966) and Griliches (1971), the price of a car represents the
valuation of the attributes of the car (as in Couton, Gardes, & Thepaut, 1996). Initially, hedonic
studies of automobiles were employed to estimate quality-adjusted prices (Court, 1939; Triplett,
1969, 1986; Cowling & Cubbin, 1971; Griliches, 1971; Ohta & Griliches, 1976; as in Espey & Nair,
2005). Later research focused on the valuation of safety features and used these estimates to
derive values of life (Atkinson & Halvorsen, 1984; Dreyfus & Viscusi, 1995; Dunham, 1997; as in
Espey & Nair, 2005). Hedonic evaluations have also been done of the relationship between
vehicle quality and warranties (Douglas, Glennon, & Lane, 1993; as in Espey & Nair, 2005) and of
producer market power (Mertens & Ginsburgh, 1985; Thompson, 1987; as in Espey & Nair,
2005). There have been many studies attempting to estimate consumer willingness to pay for
fuel economy (Atkinson & Halvorsen, 1984; Couton, Gardes, & Thepaut, 1996; Espey & Nair,
2005; Goodman, 1983; Kiso, 2010). As far as I am aware, no one has previously attempted to
identify a willingness to pay for the hybrid label in excess of the willingness to pay for fuel
economy and reduced emissions.
It has been well established that consumers are willing to pay more for eco-labeled
products than for comparable non-labeled products (Asche, Larsen, Smith, Sogn-Grundvag, &
Young, 2013; Blend & van Ravenswaay, 1999; Nimon & Beghin, 1999). Nimon and Beghin (1999)
found that consumers are willing to pay 33% more for clothing made with organic cotton than
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for clothing made with non-organic cotton. In some cases, the presence of an eco-label
commands a price premium while variations in the strength of the label do not. Blend and van
Ravenswaay (1999) found that consumers were willing to pay more for eco-labeled apples than
for non-labeled apples, but that a government-backed label with stringent environmental
restrictions commanded the same premium as an unverified label with few environmental
restrictions. Delmas and Grant (2010) found a significant price premium for eco-certified wine
that lacked an eco-label but no premium for eco-certified, eco-labeled wine. They argue that
the certification process requires changes to the wine-making operation which result in an
improved product, but that eco-labels for wine are new and poorly understood by consumers
and thus tend to be ignored. Studies that specifically address hybrid vehicles tend to focus on
the relationship between hybrid adoption and government incentives (Beresteanu & Li, 2011;
Sims Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011) or the relationship between consumer choice and social
identity (Kahn, 2007; Owen, Videras, & Wu, 2010).
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Model
This analysis follows the hedonic price methodology established by Rosen (1974; as in
Espey & Nair, 2005). Automobiles are valued because they provide travel services. The
attributes of a vehicle, such as size, comfort, and engine power, determine the utility a
consumer derives from the travel services provided by the vehicle. The price of an automobile
reflects the valuation of these attributes, which vary across automobile models (Couton, Gardes,
& Thepaut, 1996). Thus, the price of a vehicle, represented by the hedonic price function, is as
follows:
Pvehicle = P ( A1, A2, … , Ak, … , An)

(1)

where each Ai is an attribute and the vehicle is comprised of n attributes. The implicit marginal
price of an attribute is found by taking the partial derivative of this function with respect to that
attribute. Therefore, the marginal price of attribute Ak would be as follows:
p (Ak) = ∂Pvehicle / ∂Ak.

(2)

In equilibrium, this represents the maximum amount that a consumer is willing to pay for an
additional unit of attribute Ak and the minimum amount that a producer would be willing to
accept to produce another unit of attribute Ak.

Data and Variables
Most of the data for this analysis were provided by The Vehicle List (2013), an online
vehicle database that caters to web developers. The database was initially compiled by a third
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party data company and is validated against industry standards such as Kelley Blue Book and is
updated quarterly. The data consist of 2,323 observations of new cars, SUVs, trucks, minivans,
and vans available in the United States and Canada in 2012, and include the Manufacturer’s
Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) and vehicle specifications. Emissions data were taken from The
Fuel Economy Guide, Model Year 2012 produced by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and the U.S. Department of Energy (2013). Fuel economy and emissions data were not available
for all observations and those vehicles missing these data were eliminated from the dataset.
The reduced dataset contains 1,909 observations.
Vehicle attributes were chosen in accordance with previous hedonic price analyses of
automobiles (Atkinson & Halvorsen, 1984; Couton, Gardes, & Thepaut, 1996; Espey & Nair,
2005; Goodman, 1983; Kiso, 2010)1. Variables representing price, size, power, performance,
comfort, and luxury status are included to control for non-environmental attributes which affect
a vehicle’s desirability. Variables for fuel consumption and emissions rating represent the
environmental attributes conveyed by the hybrid label. A variable indicating whether or not a
vehicle bears the hybrid label is also included. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
The price of a vehicle is represented by the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price
(MSRP). MSRP is the price set by the manufacturer and includes destination charges and
minimum required equipment (Kelley Blue Book, 2013). MSRP is the same for all vehicles of a
given make, model, and options package regardless of location. The actual sales price of a
vehicle may not be the same as MSRP. While actual sales prices are the preferable measure
1

Two variables of relevance that are not included in this analysis are government incentives and safety. It
is likely that government incentives, such as tax credits, affect how much a consumer is willing to pay for a
vehicle. Because of the complexity of state and federal government incentives, including them is outside
the scope of this analysis. A variable representing vehicle safety was originally intended to be included in
this analysis. However, comprehensive safety data were not available. Therefore the safety variable had
to be excluded from this analysis.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of 2012 Vehicle Data.
Variable
Price (US$)
Curb weight (lb)
Engine size (L)
Turning diameter (ft)
Leather
Luxury
Fuel consumption (gal/100mi)
Air Pollution
Hybrid

Standard
Deviation
44,053.26
945.6004
1.353679
4.008204
.4952151
.4147156
1.216478
.747251
.1980156

Mean
42,623.14
3,932.865
3.382085
38.42965
.4300681
.2205343
4.838795
5.2923
.0408591

Minimum
10,990
1,808
1
25.8
0
0
1.052632
2
0

Maximum
470,350
6,641
7
54.5
1
1
8.333333
8
1

Note: N = 1909.

they are difficult to obtain and MSRP is typically used instead (Beresteanu & Li, 2011). The
average MSRP for the vehicles in this dataset is $42,623. The Nissan Versa sedan with a manual
transmission is the least expensive vehicle in the dataset with an MSRP of $10,990. The
Maybach 62 S sedan is the most expensive vehicle in the dataset with an MSRP of $470,3502.
Vehicle size is represented by the curb weight of the vehicle. Vehicle length, width, and
wheelbase are also indicators of vehicle size. Espey and Nair (2005) argue that curb weight is
the best indicator of size because length and width are one-dimensional, wheelbase varies with
vehicle design, and curb weight is most highly correlated with the other size indicators. The
average curb weight of the vehicles in this dataset is 3,933 pounds. The smallest vehicles in the
dataset are the Smart Fortwo Pure Coupe and the Smart Fortwo Passion Coupe, each with a
curb weight of 1,808 pounds. The largest vehicles in the dataset are the Ford E-350 XL Extended
Wagon and the Ford E-350 XLT Extended Wagon, each with a curb weight of 6,641 pounds.

2

It is reasonable to expect that a functional form may not hold for observations at the top end of MSRP
range. To account for this, I excluded all observations with MSRP more than 3 standard deviations from
the mean (48 observations) and repeated the analysis. Results were similar to those reported for the full
dataset.
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Vehicle power is represented by engine size measured as engine displacement. Engine
displacement refers to the volume of space in the engine cylinders. Higher displacement means
there is more room for fuel to be burned, and hence a more powerful engine (O’Reilly Auto
Parts, 2013). The average engine displacement of vehicles in this dataset is 3.38 liters. The
vehicles with the lowest engine displacements in the dataset are the Smart Fortwo family of
vehicles, with engine displacements of 1 liter. The vehicle with the highest engine displacement
in the dataset is a Chevrolet Corvette with an engine displacement of 7 liters.
Vehicle performance is represented by turning diameter. Turning diameter measures
the clearance needed for the vehicle to complete a U-turn (Espey & Nair, 2005). Holding all
other vehicle specifications constant, a smaller turning diameter implies better handling. The
average turning diameter of the vehicles in this dataset is 38.4 feet. The vehicle with the
smallest turning diameter in this dataset is the Scion iQ with a turning diameter of 25.8 feet.
The vehicles with the largest turning diameters in this dataset are the Chevrolet Express and
Express Cargo vans and the GMC Savana and Savana Cargo vans, each with a turning diameter of
54.5 feet.
Vehicle comfort is represented by a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a vehicle has
leather seats and is equal to 0 if a vehicle does not have leather seats. Leather seats are
generally indicative of vehicle characteristics which provide a more comfortable vehicle interior
(Baltas & Saridakis, 2010). 43% of the vehicles in this dataset have leather seats.
Espey and Nair (2005) argue that the majority of vehicle categories, such as small, large,
coupe, and wagon, will be captured by size, power, and performance variables. The only
category which will not be captured by other variables is luxury vehicles. Therefore, a dummy
variable for luxury is included and is equal to 1 if a vehicle is considered a luxury vehicle and is
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equal to 0 if a vehicle is not considered a luxury vehicle. 22.1% of the vehicles in this dataset are
considered luxury vehicles.
Vehicle specifications in the United States generally report vehicle fuel economy,
measured in miles per gallon. Previous research has found that vehicle fuel consumption,
measured in gallons per 100 miles, better represents the fuel costs consumers can expect over
the lifetime of a vehicle (Espey & Nair, 2005; Kiso, 2010). Since lifetime fuel cost affects the
lifetime cost of the vehicle, fuel consumption is more appropriate to consider when making a
vehicle purchasing decision than is fuel economy. Fuel economy is represented by the
Environmental Protection Agency combined estimate, which gives the fuel economy one can
expect if 55% of driving takes place in stop-and-go traffic and 45% of driving takes place on rural
roads or highways (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency & the U.S. Department of Energy,
2013). Therefore, the combined fuel economy estimate is a better representation of a vehicle’s
overall fuel economy than is either the city fuel economy estimate or the highway fuel economy
estimate alone. The combined fuel economy estimate captures the fact that hybrid vehicles can
achieve high fuel economy under stop-and-go driving conditions, but not under highway driving
conditions. Fuel consumption is calculated by taking the inverse of fuel economy and
multiplying by 100 to give gallons per 100 miles driven. The average fuel consumption of
vehicles in this dataset is 4.8 gallons per 100 miles. The Toyota Prius Plug-in Hybrid has the
lowest fuel consumption of vehicles in this dataset, using 1.05 gallons per 100 miles driven. The
highest fuel consumption of vehicles in this dataset is 8.33 gallons per 100 miles driven. Several
vehicles in this dataset report this fuel consumption, including the Chevrolet Suburban SUV, the
Chevrolet Express van, the GMC Yukon XL SUV, the Lexus LFA coupe, the Maybach 57 and 57 S
sedans, and the Maybach 62 and 62 S sedans.
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Vehicle emissions are represented by a vehicle’s federal Air Pollution Score. This score
measures a vehicle’s tailpipe emissions and compares them to U.S. government standards (U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2013). The score is on a scale from 1 to 10, where a
score of 10 indicates that a vehicle emits no pollutants that contribute to local and regional air
pollution. The federal government also measures greenhouse gases and rates vehicles on the
Greenhouse Gas Scale. This score is directly related to a vehicle’s fuel economy. That is,
vehicles with higher fuel economy will have higher Greenhouse Gas Scores (EPA, 2013).
Therefore, this metric should be captured by fuel consumption and is not included in this
analysis. The average Air Pollution Score for vehicles in this dataset is 5.3. The lowest Air
Pollution Score for vehicles in this dataset is 2. 33 vehicles in this dataset had Air Pollution
Scores of 2. The highest Air Pollution Score for vehicles in this dataset is 8. 5 vehicles in this
dataset reported this Air Pollution Score, including the Honda Civic Hybrid, the Honda Civic
Natural Gas, the Honda CR-Z, the Hyundai Sonata Hybrid, and the Kia Optima Hybrid.
Whether or not a vehicle is labeled as a hybrid vehicle is represented by a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 if the vehicle bears the hybrid label and is equal to 0 if the vehicle
does not bear the hybrid label. 4% of the vehicles in this dataset are labeled as hybrid vehicles.
The variables detailed above comprise the base model of this analysis. It is clearly not
possible to include variables which account for all attributes consumers value. It is therefore
likely that the estimated effects of these variables will include the effects of other attributes not
accounted for in the base model. One attribute which can affect a consumer’s perception of
vehicle quality and reliability is the vehicle’s country of origin (Couton, Gardes, & Thepaut,
1996). Here country of origin refers to the country in which the vehicle maker is based, not the
country where the vehicle was actually built. Country of origin dummy variables will be added
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to the base model in order to observe the effect on the estimates of base model variables. The
vehicles in this dataset originated in 7 countries, including England, Germany, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, Sweden, and the United States. The distribution of vehicles by country of origin is given
in Table 2.

Table 2. Vehicle Distribution by Country of Origin.
Country of Origin
Number of Vehicles
England
80
Germany
417
Italy
18
Japan
639
South Korea
118
Sweden
33
United States
604
Total
1,909

Percentage of Total Vehicles
4.19
21.84
0.94
33.47
6.18
1.73
31.64
99.99

Note: Percentage of total vehicles does not sum to 100% because of rounding.

All vehicles originating in the same country do not have the same attributes. It is likely
that even when countries of origin are added to the base model the estimated effects of the
base model variables will still contain effects of unspecified attributes. To further control for
variation between vehicle manufacturers, dummy variables for each manufacturer will be added
to the base model in order to observe the effect on the estimates of base model variables.
There are 42 makers represented in the dataset. The maker with the most models represented
in the dataset is Volkswagen with 221 models, comprising 11.58% of the observations. The
maker with the fewest models represented in the dataset is Bentley with 2 models, comprising
0.10% of the observations. The complete distribution of vehicles by maker is given in Appendix
A.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The hedonic price model was estimated by linear regression using ordinary least
squares. Robust standard errors were used because it is unlikely that this dataset satisfies the
homoskedasticity assumption. Three versions of the hedonic price model were estimated. The
first version contains only the base model variables: price, curb weight, engine size, turning
diameter, leather, luxury, fuel consumption, air pollution, and hybrid. The second version adds
country of origin indicators to the base model variables. The third version adds maker indicators
to the base model variables. The regression results for the base model variables for each
version are reported in Table 3. The full regression results for the versions containing country of
origin indicators and maker indicators are reported in Appendix B.
The estimated effects of these vehicle attributes should not be taken as literal estimates
of the dollar values of the attributes. For example, consumers are not willing to pay $8,331 or
more to add leather seats to a vehicle. The directions of the estimated effects are of more
interest than the magnitudes of the estimated effects. The magnitudes of the estimated effects
are of interest when comparing the base model, the model including country of origin, and the
model including makers to each other.
Curb weight represents vehicle size and I would expect consumers to be willing to pay
more for a larger vehicle. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the estimated effect of curb
weight is negative in all three regressions. The negative effect makes sense, however, when
curb weight is interpreted conditional upon engine size. Given two vehicles with engines of the
same size, a smaller vehicle is likely to be sportier and therefore more expensive. For example,
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Table 3. Regression Results for Price on Base Model, Base Model with Country of Origin,
and Base Model with Maker.
Base Model
Base Model w/
Base Model w/
Country
Maker
Estimate
Estimate
Estimate
Price
(Std. Error)
(Std. Error)
(Std. Error)
Curb weight
-22.9304***
-9.11918**
-7.086072**
(3.66829)
(3.595859)
(3.144758)
Engine size
11,756.51***
9,292.461***
7,563.483***
(2,177.123)
(1,671.437)
(973.0125)
Turning diameter
-939.209***
-446.363*
-543.7902***
(300.5339)
(273.1122)
(149.4134)
Leather
16,964.42 ***
15,270.64***
8,331.136***
(1,796.864)
(1,472.897)
(738.9328)
Luxury
12,816.51***
3,419.611
5,109.212
(2,731.438)
(3,409.668)
(4,570.404)
Fuel consumption
21,273.63***
13,901.47***
8,583.9***
(3,843.608)
(3,718.053)
(2,930.248)
Air pollution
2,309.44***
2,958.368***
1,508.646***
(870.4958)
(843.0743)
(379.7089)
Hybrid
31,037.01***
26,709.02***
16,698.26***
(5,155.711)
(4,936.517)
(3,299.043)
Constant
2,585.816
-41,146.4**
4,073.944
(12,576.23)
(16,197.62)
(8,624.46)
Observations
1909
1909
1909
R2
0.4215
0.5792
0.8540
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

the Porsche 911 Carrera and the Hyundai Genesis Coupe both have 3.8 liter engines. The
Porsche weighs 3,131 pounds and costs $91,900, while the Hyundai weighs 3,397 pounds and
costs $32,250. While there are many other differences between these two vehicles, the 3.8 liter
engine feels more powerful in the lighter Porsche than in the heavier Hyundai. Consumers are
therefore willing to pay more for the smaller vehicle.
The estimated effect of engine size is positive, as would be expected. Given two
vehicles of the same size, the vehicle with the more powerful engine is likely to be sportier and
more expensive. Likewise, the negative estimated effect for turning diameter makes sense.
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Given two vehicles of the same curb weight and engine size, the vehicle with the smaller turning
diameter should handle better and be more expensive. Allowing curb weight and engine size to
vary could yield a different result. The Ford Mustang has a larger turning diameter than the
Toyota Yaris. The Mustang also weighs more than the Yaris and has a larger engine. However,
the Mustang is the more performance-oriented vehicle and the prices reflect this ($33,710 for
the Mustang and $15,625 for the Yaris).
The positive estimated effect for leather seats is to be expected. Leather seats
represent a host of vehicle attributes that make traveling in a vehicle more comfortable.
Consumers value comfort and are willing to pay a higher price for a more comfortable vehicle.
Similarly, the positive estimated effect for luxury vehicles is to be expected. It is interesting to
note that the luxury dummy variable is statistically significant in the base model but not in the
models including country of origin and maker. Luxury is a subjective attribute; what is luxurious
to one consumer may not be luxurious to another. Luxury status loses it explanatory power
when country of origin and maker are included because those attributes are objective and allow
consumers to decide for themselves whether or not a vehicle is luxurious.
The positive estimated effect of fuel consumption is initially surprising. This implies
that, all else equal, consumers will pay more for a vehicle that requires more fuel to travel a
given distance. A vehicle with greater fuel consumption will require more fuel over its lifetime
and will therefore have a higher lifetime fuel cost. However, as with vehicle size, fuel
consumption should be considered in conjunction with other attributes. As illustrated in Table
4, fuel consumption is highly correlated with both curb weight and engine size. Consumers are
willing to pay more for roomier, more powerful vehicles and those vehicles tend to have higher
fuel consumption.
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix for Fuel Consumption, Curb Weight, and Engine Size.
Fuel Consumption
Curb Weight
Engine Size
Fuel Consumption
1.0000
Curb Weight
0.7968
1.0000
Engine Size
0.8755
0.8109
1.0000

The positive estimated effect for Air Pollution Score makes sense. A higher score is
indicative of cleaner tailpipe emissions. Consumers who are concerned with how their vehicles
impact the environment will be willing to pay more for a vehicle that emits fewer pollutants.
Consumers who are not concerned with their vehicles’ environmental impact may also be willing
to pay more for a vehicle that emits fewer pollutants if cleaner emissions are indicative of other
desirable vehicle attributes such as a more efficient engine.
The estimated effect of bearing the hybrid label is positive and statistically significant in
all three regressions. This indicates that, for given levels of fuel consumption and emissions,
consumers pay more for a vehicle that bears the hybrid label. Since the hybrid label is intended
to identify vehicles that consume less fuel and have cleaner emissions, this result implies that
consumers are receiving value from the hybrid label itself and not just the attributes it
represents. Previous research suggests that this value is elevated social status derived from
being seen in a hybrid vehicle (Sims Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011; Kahn, 2007).
Comparing the base model to the models with countries of origin and makers, most
estimated effects decrease in magnitude as the model becomes more finely specified. That is,
including country of origin decreases the estimated effects of the base model attributes because
country of origin captures some of the quality and reliability effects that were previously
ascribed to the base model attributes. Likewise, including vehicle maker captures some of the
variation in quality and reliability between makers who are from the same country. Not all
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estimates are strictly decreasing from base model to country of origin model to maker model,
but estimated effects in the country of origin and maker models are both generally of smaller
magnitude than those in the base model. The effects of unspecified vehicle attributes are
clearly still being captured by the estimated effects of the base model attributes even in the
model which includes maker dummy variables. This can be seen in the estimated effect of
bearing the hybrid label. The hybrid effect decreases from $31,037 in the base model to
$16,698 in the maker model. However, this is still an unreasonably high estimate.
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CHAPTER FIVE
OREGON ANALYSIS

One drawback of the preceding hedonic price analysis is that it does not represent the
demand for hybrid vehicles. Even assuming that the MSRP is a perfect reflection of the actual
sales price of a vehicle, the hedonic price analysis contains no information on the quantity of
vehicles sold. I will address this issue using county-level data from Oregon. Hybrid vehicles are
best suited for urban areas. Therefore, hybrid registration rates should be increasing with
population density. If consumers are buying hybrids in order to elevate their social status,
hybrid registration rates should be increasing with environmentalism (Kahn, 2007).
Much of the data for this analysis were taken from the Data Center of the Statesman
Journal (Statesman Journal Data Center, 2012a, 2012b), a newspaper in Salem, Oregon. The
Statesman Journal Data Center is an interactive presentation of data compiled from a variety of
Oregon state entities. Data on population, income, and vehicle registration originated with the
Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) of the Oregon Department of Transportation.
Voter registration data originated with the Office of the Oregon Secretary of State. Data on
county size and city populations were taken from the Oregon Blue Book (2013), the state’s
official directory and fact book. Data on education were taken from the U. S. Census Bureau
(2013). All data are from 2011 except for Census data which is from 2010. Summary statistics
are reported in Table 5.
There are 36 counties in the state of Oregon. The average county population in Oregon
is 106,419 people. Multnomah County has the largest population with 735,334 people and
Wheeler County the smallest population with 1,441 people. The average county in Oregon
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Table 5. Summary Statistics of Oregon County Data.
Standard
Variable
Mean
Deviation
Population
106,418.7
162,542.1
Area (sq mi)
2,698.056
2,502.897
Population density (pop/sq mi)
106.7102
283.3663
Median income (US$)
44,295.47
6,723.466
College degree
.2166944
.078135
Hybrid/elec. per 1,000 gas
14.48222
4.769464
Pacific Green share
.0026887
.0017763

Minimum
1,441
465
.7256551
33,403
.107
8.27
0

Maximum
735,334
10,228
1,581.363
62,574
.474
29.39
.0076061

Note: N = 36.

covers 2,698 square miles. The largest county in Oregon is Harney County with 10,228 square
miles and the smallest county is Multnomah County with 465 square miles. Population density
is calculated by dividing population by area. The average county population density in Oregon is
106.7 people per square mile. Multnomah County has the highest population density in Oregon
with 1,581 people per square mile. Harney County has the lowest population density in Oregon
with less than 1 person per square mile.
The average median county income in Oregon is $44,295. Washington County has the
highest median county income in Oregon at $62,574 and Wheeler County has the lowest
median county income at $33,403. In the average Oregon county, 22% of people age 25 or
older have a college degree. Benton County has the highest proportion of residents with a
college degree, at 47%. Morrow County has the lowest proportion of residents with a college
degree, at 11%. Counties with more educated residents and higher average incomes are
expected to have more hybrid cars (Sims Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011; Kahn, 2007).
The Oregon DMV reports the number of registered hybrid and electric vehicles per
1,000 registered gas vehicles for each county. The average county in Oregon has 14.5 hybrid
and electric vehicles per 1,000 gas vehicles. Benton County has the highest proportion of hybrid
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and electric vehicles, with 29.4 hybrid and electric vehicles per 1,000 gas vehicles. Grant County
has the lowest proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles, with 8.3 hybrid and electric vehicles
per 1,000 gas vehicles.
The intensity of environmentalism in a county is measured by the proportion of
registered voters who are members of the Pacific Green Party. The Pacific Green Party states
that its mission is to promote the values of “Peace, Sustainability, Social and Economic Justice,
and Grassroots Democracy” (Pacific Green Party, 2012, para. 1). Kahn (2007) shows that the
proportion of green party membership in a community is a good proxy for the intensity of
environmental sentiment in the community. The proportion of registered voters who belong to
the Pacific Green Party in the average Oregon county is 0.2%. Multnomah County has the
highest proportion of registered voters who belong to the Pacific Green Party at 0.7% and
Wheeler County has the lowest proportion with no Pacific Green Party members at all. The
small proportion of registered voters who belong to the Pacific Green Party suggests that the
party has little political strength and that party membership is an expression of ideology (Kahn,
2007).
Three linear regressions using ordinary least squares are estimated for this data. The
first regression predicts proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles from income, population
density, college education, and the Pacific Green Party’s share of registered voters. The second
regression adds a dummy variable indicating whether or not a county contains a city with a
population of 50,000 or greater. This accounts for the fact that higher county population
density does not necessarily indicate the presence of an urban environment suitable for a hybrid
car. There are 10 such counties in Oregon. The third regression takes this idea further, adding
dummy variables for the three largest cities in Oregon. These cities are Portland (population
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585,845), Eugene (157,010), and Salem (155,710). Portland spans the counties of Clackamas,
Multnomah, and Washington. Eugene is located in Lane County, and Salem spans the counties
of Marion and Polk. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6.

Table 6. Regression Results for Hybrid/Electric on Base Variables, Base Variables with Big
City Indicator, and Base Variables with Portland, Eugene, and Salem Indicators.
Base Model w/
Base Model w/ Big
Portland, Eugene,
Base Model
City
Salem
Hybrid/electric
Estimate
Estimate
Estimate
proportion
(Std. Error)
(Std. Error)
(Std. Error)
Income
0.0000095
0.00000517
-0.0000153
(.0000691)
(.0000741)
(0.000087)
Population density
0.0018218
0.0017931
0.0006973
(.0011337)
(0.0010901)
(0.0016123)
College degree
34.81158***
34.25143***
32.77337***
(7.807286)
(7.838103)
(9.140902)
Pacific Green share
824.8555***
817.8458**
927.4813***
(286.1213)
(307.6924)
(335.4423)
Big City
0.2367229
(1.123063)
Portland
1.645383
(2.099652)
Eugene
0.4143313
(1.098362)
Salem
1.6548*
(.8565737)
Constant
4.105975
4.375279
5.251122
(2.588091)
(2.970524)
(3.419198)
Observations
36
36
36
R2
0.8091
0.8093
0.8148
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

In all three models median county income and population density are neither strong nor
significant predictors of the proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles registered in a county.
This result is not surprising because both variables are very crude indicators. Median county
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income cannot reveal whether or not the wealthiest residents of a county are more likely to
own hybrid or electric vehicles. Likewise, county population density cannot distinguish between
a county with a few very dense areas and a county with moderate but evenly dispersed
population density. The proportion of county residents with a college degree has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles registered in a
county, as was expected. Counties that contain big cities do tend to have a higher proportion of
hybrid and electric vehicles. Although these effects are generally not statistically significant,
they do suggest that hybrid and electric vehicles are more common in the densely populated
urban areas to which they are best suited. The proportion of registered voters who belong to
the Pacific Green Party has a very strong and significant effect on the proportion of hybrid and
electric vehicles registered in a county. This suggests that a consumer with strong
environmental ideology is more likely to own a hybrid or electric vehicle, even if he lives in an
area to which the vehicle is not ideally suited.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The models estimated in this analysis reveal that consumers value the hybrid vehicle
label not just for the information it provides on vehicle fuel consumption and emissions, but also
for the information it conveys about a vehicle’s owner. Hedonic price analysis was applied to
data on new cars, trucks, SUVS, minivans, and vans available in the United States and Canada in
2012. The results showed that vehicle price tends to decrease with vehicle size, and to increase
with power, performance, comfort, luxury status, fuel consumption, and cleaner emissions. The
hedonic price analysis also demonstrated that, for given levels of fuel consumption and
emissions, consumers will pay more for a vehicle that bears the hybrid label. County-level data
from Oregon were also analyzed for the determinants of the proportion of hybrid and electric
vehicles to gas vehicles. The results showed that the proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles
to gas vehicles in a county increases with the proportion of county residents who have a college
degree and is not affected by median county income or county population density. The
presence of a large city in a county does increase the proportion of hybrid and electric vehicles
to gas vehicles in the county. The Oregon analysis also demonstrated that communities
containing consumers who express strong environmental sentiments are likely to have greater
proportions of hybrid and electric vehicles, even if those communities are not located in areas
ideally suited to hybrid and electric cars. Taken in conjunction, the hedonic price analysis results
and the Oregon analysis results suggest that consumers will pay more for a vehicle that bears
the hybrid label because that label increases the owner’s social status in the environmental
community and conveys to others the strength of the owner’s environmental commitment. It is
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important to recognize that eco-labels, such as the hybrid vehicle label, do not necessarily
convey the same message to producers and consumers. The increasing popularity of ecolabeled products cannot be simply and universally extrapolated as a measure of how much
consumers care about the environment. Each eco-labeled product should be examined
individually to determine what unobserved attributes that distinguish the eco-labeled product
from non-labeled products consumers may value.
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Appendix A
Distribution of Vehicles by Maker
Table 7. Vehicle Distribution by Maker.
Maker
Number of Vehicles
Acura
24
Aston Martin
38
Audi
43
Bentley
2
BMW
52
Buick
28
Cadillac
53
Chevrolet
144
Chrysler
21
Dodge
36
Fiat
6
Fisker
3
Ford
148
GMC
96
Honda
96
Hyundai
69
Infiniti
32
Jaguar
16
Jeep
32
Kia
49
Lamborghini
7
Land Rover
6
Lexus
26
Lincoln
13
Maserati
5
Maybach
4
Mazda
59
Mercedes-Benz
56
Mini
13
Mitsubishi
30
Nissan
115
Porsche
38
Ram
30
Rolls-Royce
5
Saab
18
Scion
13
Smart
3
Subaru
76
Suzuki
40
Toyota
128
Volkswagen
221
Volvo
15
Total
1,909
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Percentage of Total Vehicles
1.26
1.99
2.25
0.10
2.72
1.47
2.78
7.54
1.10
1.89
0.31
0.16
7.75
5.03
5.03
3.61
1.68
0.84
1.68
2.57
0.37
0.31
1.36
0.68
0.26
0.21
3.09
2.93
0.68
1.57
6.02
1.99
1.57
0.26
0.94
0.68
0.16
3.98
2.10
6.71
11.58
0.79
100.00

Appendix B
Results for Regressions of Price on Base Model with Country of Origin and Base Model with
Maker
Table 8. Full Regression Results for Price on Base Model with Country of Origin.
Price
Estimate
Standard Error
Curb weight
-9.11918**
3.595859
Engine size
9,292.461***
1,671.437
Turning diameter
-446.363
273.1122
Leather
15,270.64***
1,472.897
Luxury
3,419.611
3,409.668
Fuel consumption
13,901.47***
3,718.053
Air pollution
2,958.368***
843.0743
Hybrid
26,709.02***
4,936.517
England
83,595.75***
10,298
Germany
30,242.59***
4,057.707
Italy
86,798.01***
16,294.11
Japan
6,680.948***
2,2021.286
South Korea
10,721.53***
2,846.199
Sweden
11,401.5***
3,879.973
Constant
-41,146.4**
16,197.61
2

Note: N = 1909. R = 0.5792. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The United States is the omitted country of origin.
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Table 9. Full Regression Results for Price on Base Model with Maker.
Price
Estimate
Standard Error
Curb weight
-7.086072**
3.144758
Engine size
7,563.483***
973.0125
Turning diameter
-543.7902***
149.4134
Leather
8,331.136***
738.9328
Luxury
5,109.212
4,570.404
Fuel consumption
8,583.9***
2,930.248
Air pollution
1,508.646***
379.7089
Hybrid
16,698.26***
3,299.043
Acura
-1,234.594
1,255.263
Aston Martin
119,596.3***
10,768.71
Audi
27,944.72***
5,424.348
Bentley
113,754.4***
2,688.285
BMW
24,394.31***
2,881.152
Buick
-1,031.878
4,899.235
Cadillac
2,634.405
1,741.367
Chevrolet
-5,840.014
4,540.085
Chrysler
-7,909.896
5,224.383
Dodge
-7,275.666
5,010.518
Fiat
4,232.208
4,712.226
Fisker
125,233.8***
15,523.18
Ford
-2,235.769
4,800.455
GMC
-6,144.355
4,416.253
Honda
152.1608
4,614.362
Hyundai
-2,918.153
4,403.16
Infiniti
-4,071.918**
1,665.955
Jaguar
30,276.27***
6,045.537
Jeep
-7,129.091
4,703.414
Kia
-1,124.994
4,659.816
Lamborghini
165,869.6***
23,569.27
Land Rover
1,827.126
5,433.256
Lexus
15,975.25
11,208.12
Lincoln
223.4545
2,261.368
Maserati
70,732.09***
4,859.548
Maybach
358,742.3***
17,753.69
Mazda
-3,647.928
4,500.444
Mercedes-Benz
31,673.49***
4,734.328
Mini
12,384.55***
4,639.779
Mitsubishi
-1,846.423
4,574.516
Nissan
-6,013.241
4,552.193
Porsche
45,516.82***
6,358.503
Ram
-11,524.66**
4,767.446
Rolls-Royce
296,564.2***
38,345.92
Saab
4,549.042***
1,752.956
Scion
-2,735.509
4,450.642
Smart
454.1735
4,586.941
Subaru
-2,147.328
4,492.821
Suzuki
-3,720.213
4,415.23
Toyota
-4,581.28
4,484.607
Volkswagen
5,606.531
4,584.114
Constant
4,073.944
8,624.46
2
Note: N = 1909. R = 0.8540. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Volvo
is the omitted maker.
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